An evolutionary perspective on substance abuse by Nesse, Randolph M.
An Evolutionary Perspective on 
Substance Abuse 
Randolph M. Nesse 
Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 
This article describes how recent advances in understanding the evolutionary func- 
tions of emotions can help to reconcile diverse approaches to substance abuse. Emo- 
tions can be understood as specialized states that prepare individuals to cope with 
opportunities and threats. Drugs that artificially induce pleasure or block normal 
suffering disrupt these evolved mechanisms, and thus should tend to interfere with 
adaptive behavior, even if the drugs are medically safe. Nonetheless, we routinely use 
drugs quite safely to block defenses like pain, cough, and anxiety. This apparent 
contradiction is explained by the relatively small costs of defenses compared to the 
potentially huge costs of not expressing a defensive response when it is needed. An 
evolutionary perspective has implications for substance abuse research, treatment, and 
social policy. This perspective suggests that the search for etiology needs to address the 
human tendency to abuse drugs separately from individual differences in these tenden- 
cies, that clinical treatments that take account of the broad range of patients’ emo- 
tional life are well justified, and that social policies need to address substance use and 
abuse not as diseases to be cured but as human tendencies that need to be managed. 
To prepare for future drugs that will likely alter emotions safely, we urgently need a 
better understanding of the adaptive function of the emotions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over 18,000 articles have been published about substance abuse in the past 25 
years. Despite this huge outpouring of facts and theory, fundamental questions 
remain unresolved (Shaffer 1986; Brower et al. 1989). Disagreements continue 
concerning whether substance abuse is a disease, a behavior, a psychological 
problem, a social problem, or a moral issue. Arguments rage over such issues 
as whether substance abuse is caused mainly by genetic factors, life experi- 
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ences, social situations, or some combination. Divergent answers to these 
questions arise not so much from disagreement about facts but from different 
ways of thinking about substance abuse. 
This article develops an evolutionary framework for thinking about sub- 
stance abuse that can encompass otherwise divergent approaches. While natu- 
ral selection has not directly shaped a trait that motivates substance abuse, it 
has shaped the behavior regulation mechanisms on which psychotropic drugs 
act, most specifically, the emotions. Understanding the origins and functions of 
emotional pleasures and pains leads to insights about why people use psy- 
choactive substances. These insights have implications for treatment, research 
and public policy. 
THE EVOLUTION OF EMOTIONS 
The utility of the emotions as communications, motivations, and influences on 
future behavior has long been recognized, but a modem evolutionary approach 
specifies more precisely how the capacities for particular emotions increased 
the reproductive success of individuals in past generations. By emotion, I mean 
a pattern of coordinated changes in physiology, cognition, behavioral tenden- 
cies, and subjective experience that prepare an individual to cope especially 
well with a particular kind of situation. The capacities for emotions and their 
regulating mechanisms have been shaped by natural selection, which maxi- 
mizes reproductive success, not survival (Daly and Wilson 1983), and maxi- 
mizes individual fitness, not that of groups or species (Williams 1966; Daw- 
kins 1976). It is widely recognized that emotional capacities evolved for life in 
hunter-gatherer bands and may be maladaptive in a modem setting (Konner 
1983). 
An evolutionary approach increasingly is providing a foundation for 
research on the emotions (Plutchik and Kellerman 1980; McNaughton 1989; 
Nesse 1990). Previously, many authors tried to specify the adaptive function 
for each emotion, just as one would for the turtle’s shell or the bluebird’s song. 
For instance, fear was said to motivate avoidance of danger, and romantic love 
to increase the success of courtship. Such explanations are limited, however, 
because one emotion may serve many functions (e.g., fear causes physiological 
arousal, communicates danger to others, inhibits socially unacceptable behav- 
ior, and motivates escape and avoidance), and several emotions may unite to 
serve one function (e.g., fear, envy, and anger combine to prevent the loss of a 
mate). Emotions are different from other traits in that they correspond not to 
specific functions but to specific situations. They have been shaped by the 
adaptive challenges of certain situations that have repeatedly influenced fitness 
during the course of evolution. 
An important characteristic of the emotions is that they are all, to some 
degree, pleasurable or painful. There are no hedonically neutral emotions 
because the force of natural selection acts only when fitness is increased or 
decreased. In general, opportunities and satisfactions induce pleasure, and 
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threats and losses induce pain. People abuse drugs mainly to seek pleasure and 
to avoid pain. Understanding the adaptive significance of painful and pleasur- 
able aspects of the emotions is an essential first step for understanding why 
people abuse drugs and how drug use interferes with adaptation. 
PAIN, PLEASURE, AND DRUGS 
The aversiveness of painful emotions motivates escape from danger and 
avoidance of threats. Physical pain motivates withdrawal from situations that 
are damaging bodily tissues, and the arousal associated with pain mobilizes the 
ability to escape and prevents reoccurrence. Congenital lack of capacity for 
pain is a serious handicap that results in severe orthopedic problems in early 
adulthood (Osuntokun et al. 1968). Diarrhea expels toxins from the gastroin- 
testinal tract. Patients with shigellosis who receive antidiarrheal drugs have 
slower recoveries and more complications (DuPont and Homick 1973). Cough 
clears foreign material from the respiratory tract. A depressed cough reflex 
increases susceptibility to pneumonia. Each of these capacities is aversive, but 
useful. Blocking such defensive responses generally decreases fitness (Wil- 
liams and Nesse 1991). 
The aversive emotions seem to serve similar functions. Fear, guilt, anger, 
grief, and low mood protect against threats to relationships, resources, and 
social status, in addition to threats to bodily integrity (Thornhill and Thomhill 
1989). Social dangers reduce reproductive success by their influence on mating 
opportunities and position in the group. Impairment of the capacities for 
mental pain is often maladaptive. For instance, a person without the capacity 
for fear would not likely survive long among the predators on the Savannah 
(Marks 1987). Phobic avoidance of the rock that last month hid a tiger might 
seem senseless, but would nonetheless be wise if there is even a small chance 
that the tiger is there again. We usually experience some anxiety because most 
of the time we face some threat or another. Calm contentment is not the normal 
state of the organism. 
Experiences that tend to increase Darwinian fitness tend to arouse plea- 
sure, and pleasure tends to generate future actions that repeat such experiences 
(Nesse 1990). Good food, sex, friendship, having children, being admired, 
having insight-these experiences bring pleasure, and people who successfully 
pursue them have a reproductive advantage. Psychoactive drugs short-circuit 
these evolved mechanisms. Cocaine and opium by-pass perception and cogni- 
tion to directly stimulate the brain mechanisms that regulate pleasure. The 
mind signals that this experience is strongly increasing fitness, hence the 
tendency to repeat such experiences. Compared to such pleasure, most ordinary 
life satisfactions are feeble. Furthermore, continued drug use both desensitizes 
brain pleasure mechanisms and disrupts normal behavior regulation mecha- 
nisms; so ordinary life becomes doubly less rewarding. Compared to what 
everyday life can offer, satisfactions provided by drugs become greater and 
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greater, in the well-known feedback spiral of chronic substance abuse (Alex- 
ander and Hadaway 1982, p. 376). 
WHY NOT USE DRUGS? 
“If drugs make people feel better, why not use them?” It is a fair question, and 
one that substance abusers often ask. They receive many answers. Drugs can 
cause disease or death or brain damage. Drugs are addicting and become the 
center of the user’s existence. Drugs have withdrawal effects. Such answers 
emphasize addiction and medical dangers. Are these the only reasons not to 
use drugs? As new agents without these dangers become available, will there 
be any medical reasons to avoid their use? 
An evolutionary view emphasizes a different danger. In a manner of 
speaking, drugs are like magnets near the compass of the mind. Any drug that 
disrupts the emotional guidance system shaped by natural selection an be 
expected to impair the person’s ability to behave adaptively. No matter how 
medically safe and nonaddicting, all psychotropic drugs should, for this reason 
alone, be considered potentially harmful. 
OVERPROTECTIVE MOTHER NATURE 
How, then, can we explain the seeming safety of many drugs? Many drugs we 
take for everyday ailments-cough, fever, pain, nausea, and diarrhea-seem to 
cause little harm. And caffeine, alcohol, and nicotine in moderate amounts 
seem not to interfere with our ability to act adaptively. In fact, they can 
increase our ability to perform certain tasks (Hanna and Homick 1977; 
Pomerleau and Pomerleau 1987; Thayer 1989). If these drugs block normal 
evolved systems, why don’t they cause harm? 
Consider the selective forces that shaped the regulation of defensive 
responses. Every control system makes some errors of excessive response and 
some errors of deficient response. Defenses are usually inexpensive, while 
failure to express a defense when it is needed can be catastrophic. Natural 
selection therefore tends to shape control mechanisms that err on the side of 
over-responsiveness for inexpensive actions that may prevent great harm. This 
is why cough suppressants, aspirin, and antianxiety agents can so often be used 
safely. 
A slightly different argument applies to pleasure. While it is important 
that positive emotions usually accompany behaviors that increase fitness, 
occasional impairment of pleasure is not catastrophic. If, however, intense 
pleasure accompanies behaviors that don’t increase fitness, much time and 
effort may be wasted. Modem life provides so many such pleasures-playing 
video games is an example-that we tend not to recognize that the pleasure 
they provide is artificial and usually unrelated to fitness. 
Selection seems to have created a mind that cannot be satisfied. We no 
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sooner accomplish one goal than satisfaction fades and we are driven towards 
another. It is possible to get enough food and water, for a time, at least, but no 
amount of social status seems to be enough. To the extent that status increases 
fitness, genes that code for acting in ways that increase status will tend to 
spread; genes that result in lack of such striving will be gradually eliminated. 
The systems that motivate us were shaped to benefit our genes, not our selves. 
Our minds were shaped to maximize fitness, not happiness. 
ETIOLOGY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
An evolutionary framework suggests that two separate questions need to be 
asked about the etiology of substance abuse: (1) Why do all humans have the 
capacity for substance abuse? (2) Why do people differ in their susceptibility 
to substance abuse? 
An answer to the first question is straightforward: We all have a capacity 
for substance abuse because our motivational systems can be directly in- 
fluenced by chemicals (Frye 1980). The seeking of certain chemicals is one 
manifestation of the generally adaptive tendency to repeat behaviors that bring 
pleasure. In this sense, trying to explain why humans use drugs is like trying to 
explain why people eat. The difference, of course, is that food intake is useful 
and selection has shaped specialized brain mechanisms that regulate food 
intake, while no mechanisms have evolved specifically to regulate psychotro- 
pic drug intake. An evolutionary view supports Siegel’s suggestion that sub- 
stance abuse is best approached as a normal human tendency, but it flatly 
contradicts his suggestion that drug seeking is a “fourth drive” (Siegel 1989). 
In the debate about whether substance abuse should be considered a 
medical disease, an evolutionary view supports a medical model in that 
substance abuse is not just socially unacceptable, but is biologically maladap- 
tive. Also, patterns of substance abuse can be viewed as syndromes with 
typical courses that result from exposure to novel agents. However, as we shall 
see, an evolutionary approach also suggests that the search for a specific 
medical etiology for substance abuse may well prove fruitless. 
INDIVIDUAL SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
Differences in individual susceptibility to substance abuse result in part from 
genetic differences. Twin studies (Goodwin 1986), family history studies 
(Cloninger 1981), and adoption studies (Schuckit 1985) show an increased risk 
of substance abuse for male offspring of alcoholics. Being raised by an 
alcoholic parent seems not to increase the risk, but the genetic offspring of 
alcoholics have alcoholism rates four times as high as those in the general 
population, even when they are reared in a nonalcoholic family (Goodwin). In 
a prospective study, the quality of the childhood environment, I.Q., and the 
parental social class were extremely weak predictors of adult alcohol abuse, 
344 R.M. Nesse 
while a family history of alcoholism and the absence of Mediterranean an- 
cestry were strong predictors (Vaillant 1983). One study is currently following 
470 men from their college years through midlife to determine the factors that 
predict substance abuse (Schuckit 1987). Those with a strong family history of 
alcoholism have relatively reduced reactions to alcohol intake in the labora- 
tory, but data on their relative rates of alcoholism are not yet available. 
Although criticism of the methods and conclusions of the studies cited 
above makes their significance uncertain (Murray et al. 1983; Searles 1988), 
genetic factors certainly do influence individual susceptibility to substance 
abuse. This does not mean however, that substance abuse is a “genetic 
disease.” Many inherited characteristics could increase susceptibility to sub- 
stance abuse, including differences in emotional reactions to different sub- 
stances, ability to control impulses, abilities to get satisfactions in socially 
acceptable ways, tendencies to low mood or anxiety, and susceptibility to 
social influences. Personality traits are moderately heritable (Plomin et al. 
1980), and it would be surprising if they did not contribute to the heritability of 
substance abuse. In the natural environment, which does not offer access to a 
variety of concentrated drugs and routes of administration, most people with 
traits that increased the tendency to substance abuse would not have any 
substance abuse disorder. Even if specific genes are found to predispose some 
people to substance abuse (Mullen 1989) these will not be “genes for 
substance abuse” but genes that have been selected because they offer some 
kind of benefit, perhaps a benefit entirely distinct from behavioral regulation. 
In certain populations, selection may have shaped protection against 
alcoholism. Low rates of alcoholism in Orientals have been attributed to a 
change in a single gene nucleotide. This change makes an inactive form of 
alcohol dehydrogenase so that drinking results in the rapid accumulation of 
toxic acetaldehyde, which causes nausea and vomiting like that caused by 
Antabuse (Smith 1986; Mullen 1989). It is difficult to say if this characteristic 
is an adaptation shaped by natural selection in Orientals, or merely a quirk that 
is adaptive. More clear is the selective force of alcohol preference today. 
Alcohol-caused motor vehicle accidents are a major cause of death in the early 
reproductive years, so natural selection should gradually decrease the human 
preference for alcohol. The time course of changes from natural selection is so 
slow, however, that cars will likely be extinct before such selection eliminates 
our taste for alcohol. 
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The greatest clinical benefit of an evolutionary view of substance abuse may 
be its explanation of why drug use is often inadvisable, even when it is not 
addicting or medically dangerous. Some patients will be helped by knowing 
that psychotropic drugs interfere with the evolved mechanisms that regulate 
behavior. 
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An evolutionary perspective also supports the principle that cessation of 
drug use is, as many clinicians have long recognized, the first step in treatment. 
Whatever methods accomplish abstinence-behavioral, psychotherapeutic, and 
social-are indicated. Also indicated are more general strategies that increase 
the person’s ability to get normal satisfactions from social life. Bad feelings, 
and lack of good feelings, are significant factors in the return to drug use. 
Helping people to feel better, whether by psychotherapy, marital counselling, 
employment change, or the use of medications, is essential, not adjunctive 
treatment. An evolutionary view also supports matching different treatments to 
the needs of individual patients (Brower 1989). Finally, it encourages both 
clinician and client to view some suffering as normal and even useful. 
There are also implications for the use of psychotropic drugs in general. 
Some people say new drugs will bring an age of human happiness, while 
others oppose almost all psychotropic drug use. Although an evolutionary 
perspective tends to support the conservative side of this argument, it also can 
specify some situations in which drug use is clearly warranted. 
First, there are situations, already discussed, in which defensive systems 
overreact. Dampening the responses of these systems can sometimes relieve 
suffering with little risk. The use of benzodiazepines to control anxiety would 
be a perfect example, except for the major problems of dependence and 
withdrawal. 
Psychotropic drugs are also appropriately used to block outmoded re- 
sponses. Our minds were shaped for an environment vastly different from that 
in which we live. The constraints on aggression in a bureaucracy, the vicissi- 
tudes of modern marriages, the possibility of working long into the night-our 
emotions do not guide us reliably in these circumstances. 
Drugs are also used to adjust arousal. Stimulants increase alertness for 
study or long-distance driving, and sedatives adjust sleep to changes in time 
zones (Thayer 1989). Such uses are exceptions to the principle that drugs are 
used for their subjective effects. In this case, they mainly adjust the timing of 
arousal to match the challenges of our unnatural world. 
Drugs can also correct brain abnormalities. It remains difficult to tell, 
however, when psychotropic drugs are correcting neurophysiological abnor- 
malities, and when they are simply blocking normal aversive emotions. It is 
tempting, but erroneous, to conclude that finding neurophysiologic correlates 
of a mental condition implies that the condition is caused by a brain abnormal- 
ity. Many neurophysiologic correlates of mental states have nothing to do with 
the etiology of the state, they are merely aspects of the operation of normal 
brain mechanisms. Evidence of a “biological disorder” is not needed, however, 
to justify the drug treatment of mental distress. Psychiatry is, in this respect, 
like the rest of medicine. A general practitioner routinely diagnoses and treats 
conditions like fever and pain that do not represent any defect in the body, but 
only the arousal of normal defenses against infection or trauma. Drugs that 
dampen the body’s defensive responses can often safely relieve discomfort, 
whether the response is cough, pain, anxiety, or sadness. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY 
An evolutionary perspective suggests that it will be impossible to “solve the 
drug problem.” Substance abuse is not a rare phenomenon of a few people in a 
few societies, but of many otherwise-normal people in most societies. Al- 
though a social phenomenon, it consists, ultimately, of the actions of individu- 
als. A difficult responsibility of any government is to set and enforce rules 
about drug use. In modem Western society, this effort is particularly difficult 
because of our wealth, freedom, leisure, travel, and the constant discovery of 
new drugs and routes of administration. 
Frustration about the failure to control drug use and recognition of the 
socially corrosive effect of a large illicit economy had led to calls for 
legalization of some abused substances (Nadelmann 1989). The tacit argument 
seems to be that society is paying too high a price for protecting deviant 
individuals from actions that harm mainly themselves. An evolutionary view 
suggests, however, that all of us, not just deviants, are susceptible to substance 
abuse and that legalization might result in substance abuse by many more 
people. 
This view does not necessarily imply that legalizing certain drugs is 
unwise. The debate about how the law should view drug use should be based 
on controlled studies and pragmatic experience, not on the erroneous notions 
that substance abusers are fundamentally different from other people, that 
substance abuse is a genetic disease, or that substance abuse is created only by 
social environment. If drug abuse is seen as an intrinsic human tendency, 
instead of a disease with a specific explanation and a specific cure, then the 
control of substance abuse can be expected to require substantial and continu- 
ing public expenditures for a variety of interventions. Even modest control of 
drug use will need every available cost-effective strategy-education, estab- 
lishment of social norms, treatment, police enforcement, legal sanctions, politi- 
cal influence on suppliers, and others still to be developed. 
THE FUTURE 
Although it seems that our society is awash with drugs, the drug age may just 
be beginning. Private entrepreneurs and pharmaceutical companies are steadily 
inventing new agents. Recently introduced antidepressants seem to induce 
confidence and a mild euphoria even in those without a depressive disorder. 
We will likely soon have drugs that relieve anxiety safely without the with- 
drawal and side effects that limit the use of present agents. Soon, we may have 
drugs that stop grief, increase self-esteem, arouse the feeling of love, and make 
people feel that their lives are more meaningful. Some argue that the invention 
of such drugs is the solution to our current dilemmas about substance abuse 
(Siegel 1989). 
How will we make decisions about how to use these agents? Should we 
treat people with drugs whenever a safe agent is available that will make them 
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better? Or, to put it more realistically, should society try to prohibit people 
from using such agents? Prepared or not, we soon will confront these ques- 
tions. We will be better able to answer them if we have a deeper understanding 
of the evolutionary functions of the emotions. 
This manuscript benefited substantially from comments from members of the Evolutionary Psychiatry 
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